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NOTES

DORMANT MINERAL STATUTES
SEVERED MINERAL INTERESTS

AND

ABANDONED

I. INTRODUCTION
In North Dakota severed mineral estates are estates in real
property with characteristics similar to those of the surface estate.'
Surface owners conveyed the minerals or conveyed the land and
reserved the minerals to create these separate estates. 2 In the past
these conveyances and reservations and the resulting estates were
given little attention due to their unknown value. 3 Throughout the
4
years many severed mineral estates became highly fractionalized.
Today, as a result, the owners of these severed mineral interests are
often hard to identify and locate, which thus hampers mineral
1. Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihn, 46 N.D. 646, 651, 180 N.W. 787, 789 (1920). See Wilson
v. Bishop, 82 Il1. 2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980). It is the majority position that severed mineral
estates are freehold estates entitled to the usual incidents of property ownership. Id. at 369, 412
N. E. 2d at 524.
2. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Morton County, 78 N.D. 29. 42, 47 N.W.2d 543, 550
(1951).
3. N.D. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM FOR JUDICIARY "B" COMMITTEE,
June 1979, at I (quoting 1969 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT) [hereinafter BACKGROUND
MEMORANDUM]. The Senate Resolution that authorized this study of severed mineral interests states
that "many mineral rights have been sold and are owned by persons not owning the surface rights to
the land. . . . fTihrough further sale and subdividing of interests, and through the inheritance of
mineral rights by numerous heirs, severed mineral rights have, in many cases, been divided into
minute fractional interests ..
" 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws 1946.
4. BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at I (quoting 1969 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT).
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exploration and development. 5 The North Dakota Legislative
Council determined that "some method of dealing with.., severed
mineral interests that fare] restricting production should be found
to assure that mineral development in North Dakota (will] proceed
at a satisfactory pace. ''6
Although North Dakota has not yet developed a legislative
solution to the problem of fractionalized dormant severed minerals
that impede energy development, 7 other states have devised various
8
solutions to the problem, among them dormant mineral acts.
These statutes set certain requirements, such as registration or
actual mineral production, which, if not met in a specified number
of years, cause the mineral estate to become extinguished and
5. Commentators have written about the obstacles to mineral development when severed
mineral estates are fractionalized and when the titles are no longer easily connected to their owners.
See, e.g., Hardy, Ancient Mineral Claims-An Obstacle to Development, 28 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N
137 (1977); Kuntz, Old and New Solutions to the Problem of the Outstanding Undeveloped Mineral Interest, 22
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 81 (1971); Smith, Methodsfor Facilitatingthe Development of Oil and Gas
Lands Burdened with Outstanding Mineral Interests, 43 TEX. L. REV. 129 (1964); Note, Severed Mineral
Interests, A Problem Without a Solution?, 46 N.D.L. REV. 451 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Severed
Mineral Interests); Note, Abandonment of Mineral Rights, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1227, 1231 (1969); Note,
Oklahoma's Absent Mineral Owners, 15 TULSA L.J. 792, 795-96 (1980). One commentator questions
whether the problem is as severe as others assert. See Outerbridge, Missing and Unknown Mineral
Owners, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 20-1, 20-57 (1979).
6. BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at I (quoting 1969 LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REP).
7. During the last 12 years North Dakota legislators have introduced various proposals
attempting to deal with dormant severed mineral interests, but none have become law. In 1969 an
Abandoned Property Act was introduced in the North Dakota Senate. N.D.S.B. 38, 41st Leg. Sess.
(1969). The bill would have declared certain mineral interests abandoned and would have placed
them in trust for the owner in the same manner as unclaimed personal property. See N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 47-30 (1978 & Supp. 1981). The bill passed the senate but was defeated in the house. See
Note, Severed Mineral Interests, supra note 5, at 459-60 (a critical analysis of this bill). In the next
legislative session a bill was introduced to tax all mineral interests and make them subject to
foreclosure and eventually subject to sale for delinquent taxes, but the bill was postponed indefinitely
in the senate. N.D.S.B. 2468, 42d Leg. Sess. (1971).
In 1973, Senate Bill No. 2227 was introduced. This bill provided a presumption that severed
minerals were abandoned if taxes were not paid, the interest was not transferred, there was no actual
production, or an affidavit of interest was not recorded. N.D.S.B. 2227, 43d Leg. Sess. (1973). After
the state attempted to give notice to possible owners, the interest was to be put up for public auction.
Id. The surface owner, however, would have an option to purchase the minerals by matching the
highest bid. Id.This bill was postponed indefinitely in the house. A similar bill was introduced and
again postponed in 1975. N.D.H.B. 1117, 44th Leg. Sess. (1975).
Also in 1975 a bill was introduced that would have required recordation of severed mineral
interests. The penalty for nonrecordation was forfeiture of the interest to the state. N.D.S.B. 2084,
44th Leg. Sess. (1975). The bill passed the senate, but was postponed indefinitely in the house. In
1977 a bill was introduced that would have deemed unrecorded, unleased, and undeveloped severed
mineral interests abandoned, vesting them in the surface estate through a theory of adverse
possession. N.D.H.B. 1317, 45th Leg. Sess. (1977). This bill passed the house, but was defeated in
the senate. Bills similar to Senate Bill No. 2084 from the 1975 session were also introduced in 1977
and 1979. N.D.S.B. 2292, 45th Leg. Sess. (1977); N.D.S.B. 2403, 46th Leg. Sess. (1979). The 1977
bill passed the senate, but not the house, and the 1979 bill was defeated in the senate.
Also in 1979 a bill identical to the 1977 House Bill No. 1317, which provided for adverse
possession of severed mineral interests, was passed in the senate, but defeated by the house.
N.D.S.B. 2443, 46th Leg. Sess. (1979). The 1979 legislature also authorized three studies relating to
severed mineral interests. 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws 1794, 1828, 1946.
In 1981 two bills were introduced to separately tax severed mineral interests. N.D.S.B. 2421,
2439, 47th Leg. Sess. (1981). Both were defeated in the senate. Two bills were introduced in the
house in 1981 to require transfer or reservation of part of the mineral estate to the surface owner
upon conveyance of the surface or mineral estate. N.D.H.B. 1335, 1626, 47th Leg. Sess. (1981).
House Bill 1335 was defeated in the house, and House Bill 1626 passed in the house, but was
defeated in the senate.
8. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. i 554.291-.294 (1967).

NOTE

merge with the surface estate. 9 Five of these statutes have been
challenged on constitutional grounds since 1977.10 The highest
court in each state, when facing the question of the statute's
constitutionality, considered issues such as procedural due process
violations 1 and impairment of contract rights.12 As a result, three
13
statutes were declared unconstitutional, those in Wisconsin,
Nebraska, 1 4 and Illinois. 15 Indiana 16 and Michigan, 17 however,
upheld the validity of their dormant mineral acts. In the recent
United States Supreme Court case of Texaco, Inc. v. Short'" the
validity of Indiana's dormant mineral act was affirmed.
States like North Dakota, which are considering similar
dormant mineral acts as a solution to the problem of dormant
severed mineral interests, should be aware of possible
constitutional challenges to these acts as they attempt to create a
just solution to this problem. This Note will examine severed
mineral estates in North Dakota and general legal principles that
affect severed mineral interests. In addition, this Note will analyze
several dormant mineral statutes and the legal challenges brought
against them.
II.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES THAT AFFECT THE ABANDONMENT OF SEVERED MINERAL INTERESTS
A.

COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF ABANDONMENT

Whether severed mineral interests can be abandoned has
9. For example, the Illinois dormant mineral legislation requires registration, actual
production, or a recorded transfer of the minerals within the last 25 years. Otherwise, the severed
minerals will vest in the owner of the surface. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
197-198 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1981) (declared unconstitutional in Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Il1. 2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980)).
10. The five statutes and the corresponding cases that considered their constitutionality are as
follows: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, 1197-198 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981), Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d
364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980); IND. ANN. STAT. § 32-5-11-1 to -8 (Burns 1980), Short v. Texaco, Inc.,
Id.
n__ -,

406 N.E.2d 625 (1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §

554.291-.294 (1967), Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed,
102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-228 to -231 (1978), Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb.
835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 700.30 (West 1981), Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co.
v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977). The State of Minnesota also has dormant
mineral legislation that was recently challenged, although in Minnesota the interest forfeits to the
state instead of merging with the surface. SeeContos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Minn.), appeal
dismissed sub non. Prest v. Herbst, 444 U.S. 804 (1979); MINN. STAT. §§ 93.52-.58 (1980).
11. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 571-72, 259 N.W.2d
316, 319 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 39-41, 299 N.W.2d 704, 708-09 (1980),
appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
13. SeeChicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977).
14. See Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978).
15. SeeWilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980).
16. See Short v. Texaco, Inc., __
Ind. -,
406 N.E.2d 625 (1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 781
(1982).
17. See Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S.

Ct. 1242 (1982).
18. 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
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become important recently because of an increased emphasis on
energy development. One commentator has noted:
when
applied,
The
abandonment concept,
frequently serves the very useful purpose of clearing title
to land of mineral interests of long standing, the existence
of which may impede exploration or development of the
premises by reason of difficulty of ascertainment of
present owners or of difficulty of obtaining the joinder of
such owners. 19
In all jurisdictions severed mineral estates are classified as
land. 20 At common law legal title to land could not be lost by
abandonment. 21 Similarly, legal title to real property could not be
relinquished through abandonment. 22 Subsequently, the principles
of abandonment that developed usually dealt with abandonment of
24
personalty 2l and interests that are not realty, such as easements
these principles of
and contract rights. 25 Nevertheless,
abandonment are important today in the area of severed minerals
because dormant mineral legislation often refers to the legal
principles of abandonment.
The law of abandonment has become well established,
requiring two elements - the intent to abandon and an act
evidencing that intent. 26 Once the elements of abandonment exist
19. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 210.1, at 112.3 (1981) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS & MEYERS].
20.1Id. § 212.
21. See, e.g., Kimberlin v. Hicks, 150 Kan. 449, 454, 94 P.2d 335, 339 (1939); Tate v. Biggs, 89
Neb. 195,203, 130 N.W. 1053, 1056 (1911).
22. See, e.g., In re Kelley, 50 Hawaii 567, 579, 445 P.2d 538, 546(1968).
23. See, e.g., Botkin v. Kickapoo, Inc., 211 Kan, 107, 505 P.2d 749 (1973) (abandonment of mill
equipment); Emmons v. Easter, 62 Mich. App. 226, 233 N.W.2d 239 (1975) (abandonment of
personal possessions).
24. See, e.g., Strauch v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co., 424 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968) (abandonment of a pipeline easement).
25. See, e.g., Melco Inv. Co. v. Gapp, 259 Minn. 82, 105 N.W.2d 907 (1960) (abandonment of
contract rights).
26. See, e.g., Lake Merced Golf& Country Club v. Ocean Shore R.R., 206 Cal. App. 2d 421,
23 Cal. Rptr. 881, 889 (1962); Sioux City v. Johnson, 165 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Iowa 1969);
__
Botkin v. Kickapoo, Inc., 211 Kan. 107, 110, 505 P.2d 749, 752 (1973); Emmons v. Easter, 62
Mich. App. 226,
-, 233 N.W.2d 239, 245 (1975); Melco Inv. Co. v. Gapp, 259 Minn. 82, 85,
105 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1960); Rumph v. Dale Edwards Inc., __

Mont.

.,

-,

600 P.2d 163,

171 (1979); Minot v. Fisher, 212 N.W.2d 837, 839 (N.D. 1973); Cundy v. Weber, 68 S.D. 214, 225-, 219 N.W. 271, 272 (1928).
26, 300 N.W. 17, 22 (1941); Statev. Murry, 195 Wis. 657,
The intent to abandon must be proven through the use of strong and convincing evidence.
Wilson v. Wheeler Farms, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). Note, however, that in
appropriate cases intent can be inferred from long continued nonuse. Id. See Botkin v. Kickapoo,
Inc., 211 Kan. 107, 110, 505 P.2d 749, 752 (1973). This evidence can consist of the statements or
acts of the owner. Conway v. Fabian, 108 Mont. 287, 306-07, 89 P.2d 1022, 1029 (1939). The act (or
failure to act) accompanying the property owner's intent to abandon must be unequivocal, decisive,
and overt, whereby the owner totally relinquishes the property. See, e.g., Storck v. Pascoe, 247 Iowa
54, 64, 72 N.W.2d 467, 473 (1955); Botkin v. Kickapoo, Inc., 211 Kan. 107, 110, 505 P.2d 749, 752
(1973); Barnes v. Hulet, 34 N.D. 576, 588, 159 N.W. 25, 29 (1916).
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simultaneously, abandonment instantly occurs. 21
Abandonment can be distinguished from mere neglect as
abandonment is an intentional act divesting an owner of title to his
property, 28 while neglect is unintentional. Similarly, courts often
state that mere nonuse is not sufficient to constitute
abandonment. 29 Abandonment can also be distinguished from
forfeiture. Forfeiture is coercive; abandonment is voluntary.3 0
Furthermore, the act of abandonment is not a transfer to another
person, such as a sale, barter, or gift; rather, the property is freed
by one party who has no intention of repossessing or reclaiming it
and is indifferent to what will become of it in the future. 3' With
abandonment, the combination of the two elements, act and intent,
32
results in a total loss of the property.
The conclusion that a severed mineral estate cannot be
abandoned when it is classified as real property3 3 is complicated by
the classification of severed minerals as corporeal or incorporeal
hereditaments. 3 4 These classifications and the corresponding
27. Farmer's Irrigation Dist. v. Frank, 72 Neb. 136, 155, 100 N.W. 286, 292 (1904).
28. Vallejo v. Burrill, 64 Cal. App. 399, 408, 221 P. 676, 679-80 (1923).
29. See, e.g., Pearson v. Guttenberg, 245 N.W.2d 519, 529 (Iowa 1976); Wilson v. Wheeler
Farms, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Morgan v. Fox, 536 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976). But seeCundy v. Weber, 68 S.D. 214, 226, 300 N.W. 17, 22 (1941)(water right not
put to beneficial use since 1894 was considered impliedly abandoned).
Failure to assert legal title to land does not constitute abandonment. Hadley v. Platte Valley
Cattle Co., 143 Neb. 482, 487, 10 N.W.2d 249, 252 (1943); Engen v. Kincannon, 79 N.W.2d 160,
167 (N.D. 1956). Correspondingly, failure to pay taxes does not automatically constitute abandonment. Knowlton v. Coye, 76 N.D. 478, 485, 37 N.W.2d 343, 349 (1949). Note, though,
that in Knowlton the failure to pay taxes occurred during the depression years. Id.
30. See Coleman v. Mountain Mesa Uranium Corp., 257 F.2d 382, 383-84 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 928 (1958). See also Herman Hanson Oil Syndicate v. Bentz, 77 N.D. 20, 24, 40
N.W.2d 304, 306 (1949) (abandonment requires voluntariness).
31. See, e.g., Goltra v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 618, 625 (Ct. Cl. 1951); Del Giorgio v.
Powers, 27 Cal. App. 2d 668, __,
81 P.2d 1006, 1014 (1933); Irion v. Hyde, 107 Mont. 84, 91, 81
P.2d 353, 356 (1938).
32. Ball v. Williams, 250 Iowa 216, 222, 93 N.W.2d 723, 727 (1958).
In essence, courts look to the person who allegedly abandoned the property and consider how he
acted and what he intended. Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 946 (1965). When considering these factors courts must analyze all the facts and circumstances
involved in the owner's relationship with the property. See In re Berman, 310 Minn. 446, 452, 247
N.W.2d 405, 408 (1976). The issue of abandonment presents a question of fact. Botkin v. Kickapoo,
Inc., 211 Kan. 107, 111, 505 P.2d 749, 753 (1973). Since the proof of abandonment must be clear
and unequivocal, it will not be readily presumed. Russell v. Allen, 496 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973); Bennett v. Bowers, 238 Iowa 702, 706, 28 N.W.2d 618, 620 (1947). But see Milford v.
Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co., 355 So. 2d 687, 689 (Ala. 1978) (personalty generally considered
valueless was presumed abandoned).
33. A severed mineral estate in North Dakota is an interest in real property. Carlson v. Tioga
Holding Co., 72 N.W.2d 236, 238 (N.D. 1955).
34. The terms "corporeal" and "incorporeal" are explained in the text accompanying infra
notes 36-44. Simply, a corporeal estate is a fee simple estate similar to a solid mineral estate
recognized in jurisdictions that adopt the ownership in place theory. An incorporeal estate can be
compared to an easement in that one does not "own" the oil and gas interest. This classification is
recognized by states that have adopted nonownership theories based on the migratory nature of oil
and gas. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMS 150, 354 (5th ed. 1981).
The classification of mineral estates as real property is based upon the duration of the mineral
estate, while the classification as corporeal or incorporeal is based on its possessory nature. WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, supra note 19, § 212. The case of Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 883-86, 442 P.2d
692, 708-10, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 628-30 (1968), analyzes and distinguishes the two classifications and
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consequences concerning abandonment also are factors to be
considered when analyzing a state's dormant mineral legislation.
B.

THE CORPOREAL-INCORPOREAL DISTINCTION

As oil and gas law developed, several theories evolved that a
state could use in the classification of its mineral estates. 35 The two
main theories of mineral ownership are the nonownership theory
and the ownership in place theory. The ownership in place theory
has been adopted by the majority of states that have made a
classification. 36 In ownership in place states the oil and gas interest
is treated the same as a fee interest in solid minerals. 37 The minerals
may be severed from the surface and are considered separate
corporeal estates. 3 8 Under the nonownership theories, oil and gas
are not owned until they are "captured" or produced. 39 If this
theory is adopted mineral interests are generally viewed as
incorporeal and may not be severed from the ownership of the
40
land.
The general rule today is the same as it was at common law:
legal title to corporeal property cannot be lost or destroyed by
abandonment, but an incorporeal interest may be extinguished
under certain circumstances. 4' In a state that has adopted'the
concludes that both interests, possessory nature and duration, must be considered when determining
whether a mineral interest can be abandoned in a particularjurisdiction. Id.
35. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, S 203.
36. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, S 203.3. Arkansas is one state that has adopted this
view. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48,
-, 254 S.W. 345, 349 (1923). The Arkansas
Supreme Court stated in Goode that "separate title to the minerals is retained in perpetuity." Id. at
__,
254 S.W. at 349. Courts in Kansas, Michigan, Montana, and Nebraska also have adopted the
ownership in place theory or have classified severed mineral estates as corporeal. "Kansas
landowners own a present estate in the oil and gas in the ground ....
This is the 'ownership in place
theory.' " Mobil Oil Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 227 Kan. 594, 609, 608 P.2d 1325, 1338 (1980)
(Schroeder, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). "In Michigan we adhere to the ownership-in-place
theory." Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 89 Mich. App. 11,
-, 279 N.W.2d 574, 579 (1979) (citation
omitted). "Montana is an ownership in place state with regard to oil, gas and other minerals."
Stokes v. Tutvet, 134 Mont. 250, 255, 328 P.2d 1096, 1099 (1958). "[Wlhen a mineral estate is
conveyed [in Nebraska] an estate in fee simple in land or a corporeal hereditament is created."
Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 841, 272 N.W.2d 768, 772 (1978). Texas and Colorado also are
considered to have adopted the ownership in place theory. See Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon,
113 Tex. 247, -,
254 S.W. 296, 299 (1923) (when severance is accomplished the minerals in place
are a freehold, or an estate in fee simple); Brian v. Valley View Cattle Ranch, Inc., 35 Colo. App.
428,
-,
535 P.2d 237, 241 (1975) ("the possession and title of [a reserved] mineral interest
becomes distinct and separate from the surface estate"). Note, however, that most major oil
producing states other than Texas have adopted nonownership theories. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 19, 5 203.3.
37. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, S 203.3, at 44. AccordCallahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110,
115-16, 43 P.2d 788, 791 (1935).
38. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, 5§ 204.2, 209. See Sox v. Miracle, 35 N.D. 458, 469-71,
160 N.W. 716, 719-20 (1916) (common law definitions of corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments).
39. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, § 203.1.
40. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, SS 204.2, 209. These incorporeal interests are compared
to easements and are often described as profits a prendre. Id. Accord Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110,
118, 43 P.2d 788, 792 (1935).
41. See Tietjen v. Meldrim, 169 Ga. 678,
-,
151 S.E. 349, 359 (1930). Accord 5 G.
THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 2515, at 491 (1979).

NOTE

ownership in place theory and classifies severed mineral interests as
corporeal, it would follow that the interest could not be lost by
abandonment.4 2 At common law these severed mineral interests
could not be abandoned by their owners no matter what the owners
intended. 43 As estates in land, they had to be "owned"
continuously by someone because gaps in the chain of title to land
were disfavored.

44

If a state court has adopted a severed mineral classification of
corporeal or incorporeal, courts and legislators should consider the
classification when analyzing the issue of abandonment of severed
mineral interests. If a court has declared that the state is an
ownership in place jurisdiction with corporeal mineral interests and
further decides to allow abandonment of the mineral estate, an
ambiguity will exist that needs clarification. Legislatures in
ownership in place states are faced with the same problem when
drafting dormant mineral statutes that deem a mineral estate
abandoned after a certain period of nonuse. States, such as North
Dakota, that are contemplating the adoption of dormant mineral
legislation should consider these issues and the constitutional
challenges discussed in section V of this Note.
III.

SEVERED
DAKOTA

MINERAL

INTERESTS

IN

NORTH

In North Dakota the fee simple surface owner has the right to
everything permanently situated beneath the surface. 45 The
mineral estate may be severed from the surface estate, however,
"by a conveyance of the mines and minerals, or by a conveyance of
the land with a reservation or exception as to the mines and
minerals." 4 6 Minerals, in theory, can be severed from the surface if
42. Some courts have declared that leasehold interests can be terminated by abandonment. See
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, S 210.1.

43.5 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY 5 2515, at 491-92 (1979).
44. See Note, Abandonment of Mineral Rights, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1227, 1228 n.13 (1969). See also
Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 886-88, 442 P.2d 692, 710-11, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 630-31
(1968). In Gerhard v. Stephens the Supreme Court of California held that a severed mineral estate in
California is an incorporeal hereditament subject to abandonment upon a showing of the requisite
act and intent. Id. at 876-77, 442 P.2d at 703-04, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25. The Gerhard case is a
landmark case in that it was one of the first to consider many of the issues analyzed in this Note.
Some commentators question the validity of the corporeal-incorporeal distinction. See WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, supra note 19, § 211. One author suggested that dormant mineral interests should be
subject to abandonment based on policy reasons and that the "abstract categorization of such
interests as corporeal or incorporeal should be totally irrelevant to the question [of abandonment]."
Note, supra, at 1234.

45. N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-01-12 (1978). See Smith v. Nyreen, 81 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1957).
When the mineral estate is not severed from the surface, the title to the surface includes that which
lies beneath it. Id at 771.
46. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Morton County, 78 N.D. 29, 42, 47 N.W.2d 543, 550
(1951) (quoting Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihn, 46 N.D. 646, 180 N.W. 787 (1920)). See generally
Fleck, Severed Mineral Interests, 51 N.D.L. REV. 369 (1974).

618

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

they are owned by one who does not own the land. 47 The severance
of the minerals from the surface creates two estates, 4 8 each a
freehold estate of inheritance that may be conveyed separately
thereafter. 49 The severed estates are separate estates, considered as

if they are different parcels of land. 50 The severed mineral estate
consists of "the right or title to all, or to certain specified, minerals
in a given tract.''51 This right or title to the minerals is an interest
52
in real property.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has not specifically
stated which ownership theory applies to severed mineral interests
in the state. The case of Bilby v. Wire 3 has been interpreted to
suggest adoption of the ownership in place theory 54 because it states
that "severance of the mineral estate from the surface creates two
estates which are as distinct as if they contained two parcels of
land." 5 5 If one assumes that North Dakota is an ownership in place
state, the corporeal severed mineral interests would not be subject
56
to abandonment according to common law principles.
Furthermore, North Dakota classifies a severed mineral estate as
real property, 57 also not subject to abandonment at common law.58
This fact will be of importance later when considering the
possibility of a dormant mineral act to help solve the problem of
dormant severed mineral interests in North Dakota, as most
dormant mineral statutes consider the minerals "deemed
abandoned" after a specified period of time.
Because dormant severed mineral interests may be hindering
mineral development in the state 59 and it is the state's policy to
47. Noss v. Hagen, 274 N.W.2d 228, 234 (N.D. 1979) (Pederson, J., concurring).
48. Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 889 (N.D. 1956).
49. McDonald v. Antelope Land & Cattle Co., 294 N.W.2d 391, 396 (N.D. 1980).
50. Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihn, 46 N.D. 646, 651, 180 N.W. 787, 790 (1920).
51. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Morton County, 78 N.D. 29, 41, 47 N.W.2d 543, 550
(1951) (quoting 58 C.J.S. Mines andMinerals 5 3 (1948)).
52. Carlson v. Tioga Holding Co., 72 N.W.2d 236, 238 (N.D. 1955). See Texaro Oil Co. v.
Mosser, 299 N.W.2d 191 (N.D. 1980). In Texaro the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that "[a]
'mineral interest' is a real property interest created in oil and gas in place." Id. at 194 (quoting
Stratman v. Stratman, 204 Kan. 658, 662, 465 P.2d 938, 942 (1970)).
53. 77 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1956).
54. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 19, § 209, at 102.
55. Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 889 (N.D. 1956).
56.5 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY S 2515, at 491 (1979).
57. Carlson v. Tioga Holding Co., 72 N.W.2d 236, 238 (N.D. 1955).
58. See In re Kelley, 50 Hawaii 567, 579, 445 P.2d 538, 546 (1968).
59. See S. Con. Res. 4079, 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws 1946. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 4079
stated:
[I]n many cases severed mineral interests have, for practical purposes, been
abandoned as worthless .... [Tlitle to abandoned severed mineral interests should be
legally acquired by the state or its political subdivisions so that such property may be
resold to surface owners or other interested purchasers and thereby returned to
valuable use ....
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encourage mineral development,6" the North Dakota Legislature
probably will continue to consider methods to eliminate obstacles to
such development. Before the analysis of dormant mineral acts in
the next section of this Note, more traditional remedies applicable
61
in North Dakota and their limitations will be discussed.
North Dakota currently has a statute whereby undivided
mineral interests belonging to unknown owners can be put into
trust after court proceedings initiated by another mineral owner in
the same property. 62 Although this statute seems to solve a limited
number of severed mineral problems, commercial institutions are
not eager to become trustees for numerous individual fractionalized
mineral interests for an unspecified period of time.
A traditional remedy used by some states to deal with the
problems of dormant severed minerals is a marketable record title
statute. 63 Although North Dakota has a Marketable Record Title
Act, 64 the usual application of this Act has no effect on a severed
60. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 38-08-01 (1980). Section 38-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code
states that it is "in the public interest to foster, to encourage, and to promote the development,
production, and utilization of natural resources of oil and gas in the state . . . [so that] the general
public [may] realize and enjoy the greatest possible good from these vital natural resources." Id.
61. See Outerbridge, supra note 5, at 20-10 to 20-25 (general analysis of the traditional remedies
of taxation, compulsory pooling statutes, permissive development statutes, and marketable title
statutes).
62. N.D. CENT. CODE 55 38-13-01 to -04 (1980). Section 38-13-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code allows a district court to set up a trust "[wihere any undivided mineral, leasehold, or royalty
interest in land is claimed or owned by a person whose place of residence and whereabouts is
unknown" and when satisfactory proof is shown that "a diligent but unsuccessful effort to locate
such owner or claimant has been made." Id. S38-13-01. Section 38-13-02 limits this remedy so that
trustee proceedings may be instituted only by petition of one who owns a mineral, leasehold, or
royalty interest in the same land. Id. S 38-13-02. Seegenerally Outerbridge, supra note 5, at 20-46 to 2056.
63. Florida has a marketable title statute specifically made applicable to rights of entry "for the
purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, or developing for oil, gas, [and] minerals." FLA. STAT. ANN.
S 704.05(1) (West Supp. 1982). The Florida Supreme Court considered the Florida statute and
decided it did not operate retrospectively, but the court did not reach the question of whether the
statute was constitutional if applied prospectively. Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch,
Inc., 275 So. 2d 521, 524, 528 (Fla. 1973). The Tufts decision was upheld in Williston Highlands
Dev. Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So. 2d 260, 261-62 (Fla. 1973). The Florida Legislature responded to
these cases by giving both prospective and retrospective effect to the statutory limit on the duration of
oil and gas exploratory and mining easements. FLA. STAT. ANN. S 704.05(3) (West Supp. 1982). The
current statutory scheme has not yet been considered by the Florida courts.
The State of Virginia has an unusual statute that is similar to a marketable record title act. VA.
CODE § 55-154 to -155 (1981). The statute creates an evidentiary presumption that no minerals exist
in certain lands after 35 years of inactivity. Id. S 55-154. Exploring, drilling, transfer or production
of the minerals, or payment of mineral taxes are activities that annul this presumption. Id. If no
activity has occurred during the proscribed period, Virginia surface owners can bring a suit in equity
to extinguish the claim. Id. S 55-155. After a six month waiting period, wherein the defendant can
explore for minerals, the court can extinguish the mineral interest. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of this statute in Love v. Lynchburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 205 Va.
140 S.E.2d 650, 653 (1965).
860, __One author has expressed approval of the Virginia statute, finding it consistent with the
constitutional principle justifying marketable title statutes. Spies, The Annual Survey of Virginia Law:
Property, 51 VA. L. REV. 1621, 1661 (1965). Another commentator, however, questions the theory of
mineral ownership used by the Virginia court in Love, because most theories of ownership of severed
mineral interests do not depend on knowledge of the existence of minerals before the existence of a
mineral estate. Discussion Notes, 22 OiL & GAS REP. (MB) 241 (1965).
64. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19.1 -01 to-11 (1978). Section 47-19.1-01 ofthe Marketable Record
Title Act provides:
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mineral estate belonging to one who is not the possessor of the
surface. The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that one must
be in actual possession of the interest he claims, to come within the
protection of the Act. 65 In a like manner, the traditional remedy of

adverse possession will not solve the problems of abandoned
severed mineral interests. Because the surface estate and the
severed mineral estate are distinct, "it follows that the title to one
cannot be acquired by adverse possession of the other. "66 Actual
possession is also essential to the adverse possession of the mineral
67
estate.
Separate assessment and taxation of severed mineral estates is
another traditional method used to deal with abandoned severed
mineral interests. 68 When these taxes are not paid, the interests
Any person having the legal capacity to own real estate in this state, who has an
unbroken chain of title to any interest in real estate by himself . . . which has been
recorded for a period of twenty years or longer, and is in possession of such real estate,
shall be deemed to have a marketable record title....
Id. § 47-19.1-01. The stated purpose of this Act is "simplifying and facilitating real estate title
transactions by allowing persons to deal with the record title owner ... and to rely upon the record
title ....
Id. §47-19.1-10.
65. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Advance Realty Co., 78 N.W.2d 705, 719 (N.D. 1956). See generally
Note, Severed Mineral Interests, supra note 5, at 454-55.
66. Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 889 (N.D. 1956).
67. Id. Ste generally Note, SeveredMineral Interests, supra note 5, at 452-54. See also Stoebuck, Adverse
Possession of Severable Minerals, 68 W. VA. L. REV. 274 (1966).
A Georgia statute uses the theory of adverse possession to provide a way for a surface owner to
terminate a severed mineral interest when the mineral owner has failed to work or attempt to work
the mineral estate and has paid no taxes on that estate for a period of seven years. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 85-407.1 (1978). An action was brought to quiet title to minerals based on this statute, but the
Georgia Supreme Court interpreted the Act as being prospective and held that no actions could be
based upon the law until 1982. Nelson v. Bloodworth, 238 Ga. 264, __,
232 S.E.2d 547, 548
(1977). The Georgia Supreme Court later affirmed its decision to limit the statute to prospective
application. Johnson v. Bodkin, 241 Ga. 336, 247 S.E.2d 764 (1978). For a further discussion of the
Nelson case, see Futrell, Environment, Natural Resources, and Land Use, 29 MERCEit L. REV. 131, 140
(1977).
68. The Minnesota Legislature has codified its legislative findings related to severed mineral
taxation. MINN. STAT. 5 272.039 (1980). The reasons given for taxing mineral interests are
applicable to other states as well:
[A] class of real property has been created which, although not exempt from taxation,
is not assessed for tax purposes and does not, therefore, contribute anything toward
the cost of supporting the governments which protect and preserve the continued
existence of property. . . .[Flor the purpose of requiring mineral interests owned
separately from surface interests to contribute to the costs of government at a time
when other interests in real property are heavily burdened with real property
taxes, .... the taxation of severed mineral interests . . . is necessary and in the public
interest....
Id. Many state courts have expressed the propriety of taxing severed mineral interests. See, e g.,
Nelson v. Teal, 293 Ala. 173, __
301 So. 2d 51,52 (1974); Red Bluff Developers v. Tehama, 258
Cal. App. 2d 668, __,
66 Cal. Rptr. 229, 231 (1968); Valls v. Arnold Indus., 328 So. 2d 471, 473
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Brown v. Lober, 63 1I. App. 3d 727, 739, 379 NE.2d 1354, 1363 (1978)
(Jones, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 75 11. 2d 547, 389 N.E.2d 1188 (1979); State ex rel.
Svoboda v. Weiler, 205 Neb. 799, 801, 290 N.W.2d 456, 458 (1980); Bannard v. New York Natural
Gas Corp., 488 Pa. 239, -,
293 A.2d 41, 50 (1972); Duval County Ranch Co. v. State, 587
S.W.2d 436, 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981). For a listing of state
statutes that provide for the assessment and taxation of severed mineral interests, see Outerbridge,
supra note 5 at 20-11,20-12. See also Note, Tax Sales, Due Process andSevered Mineral Interests in Oklahoma,
II TULSA L.J. 615(1976).
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forfeit to the state or county and can be sold at a tax sale. 69
Currently, North Dakota has a statute that requires county
assessors to list all severed minerals for taxation.7 0 Flat rate taxation
of severed minerals is the most practical taxation method; however,
this is not constitutionally possible in North Dakota. "To be
uniform [and thereby constitutional in North Dakota] property
taxes must be laid with regard to the value ...."II
Two early attempts at severed mineral taxation were held
unconstitutional by the North Dakota Supreme Court. One
violated the uniformity clause of the North Dakota Constitution,7 2
and the other violated the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution.7 3 Although severed mineral estates in North
Dakota are required by statute to be separately assessed and taxed,
it is recognized that this is not done.7 4 A 1979 North Dakota Senate
Resolution declared that "severed mineral interests are not now
assessed and taxed under laws relating to the ad valorem system of
taxing property because of the cost of determining ownership and
75
the cost of assessment, collection, and foreclosure."
In North Dakota, as in other states, traditional remedies do
not completely solve the problem of dormant severed mineral
interests. Special legislation dealing with the problem appeared to
be the answer, and as a result, several states enacted dormant
mineral statutes during the last decade. As these statutes became
effective, many were legally challenged because they took a severed
mineral interest belonging to one and vested that interest with a
surface estate belonging to another. The following sections of this
Note will examine these statutes and the corresponding legal
challenges to determine if dormant mineral acts are a feasible
69. N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-28-08 (1972). Section 57-28-08 provides that lands can become the
property of the county in which they are located upon the failure of the owner to redeem them. Id
70. Id. § 57-02-24, -25. Section 57-02-24 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that
"[tihe assessor shall list for taxation all coal and other minerals underlying any lands the ownership
of which has been severed from the ownership of the overlying strata, and shall assess such coal and
other minerals to the owner in the county in which the same actually lie." Id. § 57-02-24.
71. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. State, 57 N.D. 1, 11, 220 N.W. 436, 440 (1928). The
North Dakota Constitution provides that "Itlaxes shall be uniform." N.D. CONST. art. X, S 5
(formerly N.D. CONST. art XI, § 176).
72. A flat rate per acre per year tax on minerals was declared unconstitutional by the North
Dakota Supreme Court in Northwestern Improvement Co. v. State, 57 N.D. 1, 11, 220 N.W. 436,
440 (1928), because the tax violated the uniformity clause of the North Dakota Constitution. Id.
73. A second attempt at taxing severed minerals was also struck down by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Morton County, 78 N.D. 29, 42, 47 N.W.2d
543, 551 (1951), because the tax was discriminatory, unreasonable, and arbitrary in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. See generally Note, Severed Mineral Interests, supra note 5, at 455-58.
74. Justice Pederson, in a concurring opinion, expressed his doubt that assessors assess the
minerals separately. Noss v. Hagen, 274 N.W.2d 228, 234 (N.D. 1979) (Pederson, J., concurring).
The 1969 Legislative Council also reported on the impossibility of taxing severed minerals
separately. See BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at 2. See generally Outerbridge, supra note 5
at 20-14 (1979).
75. 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws 1946.
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alternative for states like North Dakota, in which dormant severed
mineral interests may be adversely affecting mineral exploration
and development.
IV. DORMANT MINERAL STATUTES
One popular method used by legislatures to solve the problems
connected with missing or unknown owners of severed mineral
interests is the enactment of dormant mineral statutes. These
statutes can be divided into two general categories: (1) Recordation
statutes, which impose registration requirements on severed
mineral interest owners, with the failure to record resulting in
merger with the surface estate or forfeiture to the state; and (2)
conventional dormant mineral statutes, which impose specific
requirements, such as registration, taxation, or actual production,
that, if not satisfied in a set time period, will cause the mineral
estate to be considered abandoned and will vest the mineral estate
in the owners of the surface estate out of which it was carved.
State legislatures in Minnesota,7 6 Wisconsin, 7 7 and South
Dakota7 8 enacted the first type, recordation statutes, in an attempt
to deal with their problems relating to dormant severed mineral
interests. The statutes generally describe the recordation
requirements in detail. 7 9 The Wisconsin statute also requires
76. MINN. STAT. 5§ 93.52-.58 (1980). Minnesota's severed mineral registration statute begins
by stating its purpose as follows:
The purpose of sections 93.52 to 93.58 is to identify and clarify the obscure and
divided ownership condition of severed mineral interests in this state. Because the
ownership condition of many severed mineral interests is becoming more obscure and
further fractionalized with the passage of time, the development of mineral interests in
this state is often impaired. Therefore, it is in the public interest and serves a public
purpose to identify and clarify these interests.
Id. § 93.52(1).
77. WIs. STAT. ANN. 5 700.30 (West 1981). The Wisconsin statute requires that all owners of
severed mineral rights who do not also own the surface record their claim with the county register of
deeds and pay an annual registration fee. Id. § 700.30(1).
78. S.D. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 43-30-8.1 (Supp. 1981). The South Dakota recordation statute is a
recent amendment to its marketable title statute. Id. §§ 43-30-1 to -15 (1967 & Supp. 1981). For a
discussion of various marketable record title statutes (enacted in Florida, Georgia, North Dakota,
and Virginia) and their application to severed mineral interests, see supra notes 63-67 and
accompanying text.
79. For example, the Minnesota statute requires the following:
[E]very owner of a fee simple interest in minerals . . . owned separately from the fee
title to the surface . . . shall file for record in the county recorder office . . . a verified
statement . . . setting forth his address, his interest in the minerals, and both (1) the
legal description of the property upon or beneath which the interest exists, and (2) the
book and page number or the document number . . . of the instrument by which the
mineral interest is created or acquired.
MINN. STAT. § 93.52(2) (1980). The United States, Minnesota, and American Indian tribes are
exempt from this registration requirement. Id. 5 93.52(3).
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payment of recording and registration fees,8 0 while the Minnesota
statute is connected with Minnesota's tax on severed mineral
interests.8 1 Failure to record a claim pursuant to these statutes
results in merger with or reversion to the surface estate in South
Dakota8" and Wisconsin, 83 and forfeiture to the state in
Minnesota. 84
Conventional dormant mineral acts have been enacted in
Illinois,8 5 Indiana,8 6 Michigan,8 7 and Nebraska.8 8 These acts
declare interests that have been unused for specific periods of time
to be extinguished and vest the mineral estate with the surface
owner unless the mineral owner records a claim of interest. The
legislative purpose behind the enactment of most dormant mineral
acts 89 is similar to Nebraska's - to provide a means for the
80. Wis. Stat. Ann. 5 700.30(1) (West 1981). The statute provides that "[in addition [to the
recording fee], the claimant shall thereafter pay an annual registration fee of 15 cents per acre or
fraction thereof with a minimum fee of $2 for each single description registered on the lands wherein
such mineral rights are claimed." Id.
81. In Minnesota, forfeiture of the severed mineral estate does not occur if there is "substantial
compliance with laws requiring the registration and taxation of severed mineral interests." MINN.
STAT. § 93.55(2) (1980). Severed minerals in Minnesota are separately taxed. Id. § 272.04. The tax
on severed minerals currently consists of S.25 per acre per year or $2.00 per interest per year,
whichever is greater. Id. 5 273.13 (2a).
In the case of Contos v. Herbst, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered constitutional
challenges to the taxation of severed minerals based on the lack of uniformity within the ad valorem
system and the lack of an actual property valuation foundation for the tax. Contos v. Herbst, 278
N.W.2d 732, 740 (Minn.), appeal dismissed sub noma. Prest v. Herbst, 444 U.S. 804 (1979). The
Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed these objections, but found that they did not render the tax
unconstitutional. Id.
82. Unless one claiming a severed mineral interest in South Dakota records an instrument
describing that interest with the register of deeds at least once every 10 years, it will merge with the
surface estate. S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 43-30-8.1 (Supp. 1981). This statute has not yet been
construed by the South Dakota courts.
83. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.30(1) (West 1981). The Wisconsin statute states the following:
"Failure to register any claim of mineral rights shall result in reversion of such rights to the surface
fee owner. Failure to pay the registration fee within 3 years of the annual due date shall cause all
rights to revert to the surface fee owner." Id. In 1977 this statute was found unconstitutional by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 571, 259
N.W.2d 316, 318 (1977). The effect of Pedersen is that owners of severed mineral interests in
Wisconsin today do not have to record their claims or pay the accompanying registration fee.
84. Under the Minnesota system, failure to file a verified statement of ownership pursuant to the
statute results in the forfeiture of the mineral interest to the state after notice and opportunity for a
hearing. MINN. STAT. § 93.55(1) (1980). Prior to a 1979 amendment the Minnesota statute did not
provide for notice and a hearing. The notice and hearing requirements were added after the
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the statute violated the due process clause. See Contos v.
Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 742 (Minn.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Prest v. Herbst, 444 U.S. 804
(1979).
197-198 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1969), held
85. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
unconstitutionalin Wilson v. Bishop, 82 111.2d364, 373, 412 N.E.2d 522, 526(1980).
86. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-11-1 to -8 (Burns 1980) (enacted in 1971), held constitutional in Short
v. Texaco, Inc., -

Ind.

-,

-,

406 N.E.2d 625, 632 (1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).

87. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §5 554.291-.294 (1967) (enacted in 1963), held constitutional in Van
Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 56, 299 N.W.2d 704, 716 (1980) (4-3 decision), appealdismissed, 102
S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
88. NEB. REV. STAT. 55 57-228 to -231 (1978) (enacted in 1967), held unconstitutionalas retroactively
appliedinWheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 845, 272 N.W.2d 768, 774 (1978).
89. The Illinois statute stated its purpose as follows:
[T]o provide for the termination of dormant mineral interests in land owned by
persons other than the owners of the surface and for the vesting of title to same in the
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termination of "dormant and abandoned severed mineral .
interests in real estate. "90
The four conventional statutes apply to different mineral
interests. For example, the Michigan statute embraces "[a]ny
interest in oil or gas," 9' and the Illinois statute refers to "[a]ny
interest in oil, gas or associated hydrocarbons, liquid or
gaseous.' '92 The Indiana and Nebraska statutes are somewhat
93
broader as they cover all severed mineral interests.
Conventional dormant mineral acts are specific as to what
"nonuse" must be found before a mineral interest is terminated. A
severed mineral interest in Nebraska will not be abandoned
pursuant to the statute if the record owner has publicly exercised
his right of ownership during the last twenty-three years. 94 There
are many ways to exercise this right in Nebraska:
[B]y (1) acquiring, selling, leasing, pooling, utilizing,
mortgaging, encumbering, or transferring such interest
or any part thereof by an instrument which is properly
recorded in the county where the land from which such
interest was severed is located; or (2) drilling or mining
for, removing, producing, .or withdrawing minerals . . .
or (3) recording a verified claim of interest .... 95
Conventional dormant mineral statutes also designate the
number of years of nonuse that must transpire before an interest is
deemed abandoned. The Indiana 96 and Michigan 97 statutes require
a period of twenty years; Nebraska 98 requires twenty-three years;
surface owners in the absence of the filing of a notice of claim of interest within a
specified period of time.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
197 (note) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). The Michigan statute's stated
purpose is almost identical to the one above, the difference being that it refers to "the termination of
dormant oil and gas interests" instead of dormant mineral interests. MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. §
554.291 (1967) (caption). This is just one of the many similarities between the Illinois and Michigan
dormant mineral acts. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
197-198 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981) with
MIcH. Comp. LAWs ANN. 5554.291-.294 (1967).
90. 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 687, 689 (1979) (quoting Statement of Purpose on L.B. 158." Public Works
Comm., 77th Leg., 1st Sess. (1967)).
91. MICH. COMp. LAWs ANN. § 554.291(1)(1967).
92. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, 197 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
93. IND. CODE ANN. 5§ 32-5-11-1 to -2 (Burns 1980) ("[ainy interest in coal, oil and gas, and
other minerals"); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 57-228 (1978) ("mineral interest").
94. NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-229 (1978).

95. Id. In Michigan the issuance of a drilling permit for a mineral interest also prevents the
interest from becoming abandoned under the statute. MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 554.291(1) (1967).
A mineral interest in Indiana is held by production and is held "when operations are being
conducted thereon for injection, withdrawal, storage or disposal of water, gas, or other fluid
substances, or when rentals or royalties are being paid . . . or when taxes are paid on such mineral
interest by the owner thereof." IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-3 (Burns 1980).
96. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 (Burns 1980).
97. MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 554.291 (1967).

98. NEB. REV. STAT. S 57-229 (1978).
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and Illinois9 9 requires twenty-five years.
These dormant mineral statutes use the concept of
abandonment to clear titles of ancient, unused mineral interests.1 0 0
The Illinois, Michigan, and Nebraska statutes provide that when
the severed mineral interest is unused for the specified number of
years, it will be considered abandoned' 0 1 and thereafter vested in
the owner or owners of the surface. 10 2 All four conventional
dormant mineral acts provide for preservation of the severed
mineral interest through recordation of a written claim of interest
in the county register of deeds office. 10 3 The effect of recording a
claim of interest is preservation of the interest for the number of
years specified in the statute. For example, recording a notice of
interest in Michigan protects the interest from the operation of the
act for a period of twenty years, and the interest may be preserved
10 4
indefinitely by filing notices each succeeding twenty year period.
Some statutes exempt government bodies from the recordation
procedure.

05

1

Minnesota and Wisconsin's recordation statutes and the
conventional dormant mineral acts enacted in Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, and Nebraska have each been constitutionally
challenged in the state's highest court. The supreme courts in
Illinois, 106 Minnesota, 10 7 Nebraska, l08 and Wisconsin'0 9 declared
99. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, 197 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
100. See Outerbridge, supra note 5, at 20-27.
197 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981): MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
101. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
§ 554.291 (1967): NEB. REv. STAT. § 57-229 (1978). The Indiana statute uses the term
"extinguished" instead of abandoned. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 (Burns 1980).
The Nebraska statute is unique in that the surface owner must bring an action in equity to
terminate the severed mineral interest. The Nebraska court considers whether the interest has been
abandoned and, if so, terminates the mineral interest and vests the title in the surface owners. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 57-228 to -230 (1978).
197 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); MICH. Coip. LAWS ANN.
102. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
554.291 (1967): NEB. REV. STAT. 5 57-230 (1978). The Indiana statute states that the mineral
interest "shall revert to the then owner of the interest out of which it was carved. " IND. CODE ANN.
§32-5-11-1 (Burns 1980). The Indiana statute has another unique section that allows a person who
succeeds to the ownership of a mineral interest to give notice of the lapse of the mineral interest to the
mineral interest owner or the public. Id. § 32-5-11-6.
198 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-4
103. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
(Burns 1980); MICH. COMP.LAWS ANN. S 554.292 (1967); NEB. REv. STAT. § 57-229 (1978). The
Indiana statute provides for a separate "Dormant Mineral Interest Record" book to be kept in the
county recorder's office for the recordation of these claims. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-7 (Burns
1980).
104. MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. 5 554.292 (1967).
105. The Michigan statute exempts "any interest in oil or gas owned by any governmental body
or agency thereof." MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 554.292 (1967). Nebraska exempts "mineral
interests of which the State of Nebraska or any of its political subdivisions is the record owner." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 57-229 (1978).

The Indiana statute has a special section stating that failure to file will not extinguish the
mineral interest if four criteria are met, including owning ten or more mineral interests. IND. CODE
ANN. 5 32-5-11-5 (Burns 1980).
106. Wilson v. Bishop, 82 11. 2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980).
107. Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 742 (Minn.), appeal dismissedsub nom. Prest v. Herbst,
444 U.S. 804 (1979).
108. Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978).
109. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977).
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the statutes unconstitutional in some way, but the supreme courts
in Indiana'" and Michigan 1 ' upheld the statutes. In a five-four
decision rendered in January 1982, the United States Supreme
Court upheld the Indiana Supreme Court's determination that the
Indiana Dormant Mineral Interests Act is constitutional." 2 The
Court also dismissed an appeal of the Michigan Supreme Court's
decision upholding the constitutionality of Michigan's dormant
mineral act."' The six state supreme courts and the United States
Supreme Court considered many challenges to the dormant
4
mineral acts, including several constitutional challenges. "
V. CHALLENGES TO THE ACTS
The conventional dormant mineral acts adopted in Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, and Nebraska have many similarities. The
Nebraska and Illinois statutes, however, were found to be in
violation of constitutional provisions, while the Indiana and
Michigan statutes were upheld."15 The dilemma courts have faced
when considering the constitutionality of dormant mineral acts has
been stated as follows:
[I]n our energy short and energy conscious generation,
the legislative act has a real public purpose - to
encourage exploration and drilling of new gas and oil
wells....
On the other hand, the gas and oil interest holders
have a property right given them by private publicly
recorded contracts ....
Whose rights are paramount, the
16
state's or the individual's?
Because of the nature of this problem, a court's balancing process
and resolution of these issues seems to depend a great deal upon its
philosophy regarding mineral development.
The Indiana and Illinois courts illustrate this proposition. The
,406
N.E.2d 625 (1980), af'd, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
110. Short v. Texaco, Inc.,.
Ind.
111. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct.
1242 (1982).
112. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
113. Larsen v. Van Slooten, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
114. Constitutional issues discussed in several cases include due process violations, impairment
of contracts, taking without just compensation, and equal protection violations. See, e.g., Texaco,
Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982); Short v. Texaco, Inc.,
-Ind.
-, 406 N.E.2d 625 (1980),
aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
115. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
268 N.W.2d 881, 882 (1978), rev'd sub nom.
116. Bickel v. Fairchild, 83 Mich. App. 467, -,
Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 1242
(1982).
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thesis that controlled the Indiana Supreme Court's determination
in upholding the constitutionality of Indiana's statute was that the
legislature validly exercised its police power11 7 in enacting a statute
that should be justified as a matter of policy.1 18 The court
emphasized "[tlhe dependence of local economies upon the
mineral recovery industry and the entire State upon limited fossil
fuel resources."' 119 The Indiana court upheld the statutory
forfeiture method within the Mineral Lapse Act as a valid and
practical method whereby the public interests of marketable title,
energy exploration, and effective utilization of land could be
achieved. 120
Although the Illinois court also recognized the beneficial
purpose of the Illinois statute in facilitating oil and gas production,
it found that the lack of procedural safeguards available for vested
property owners rendered the act unconstitutional. 12 1 The Illinois
trial court stated that "the constitutional provisions of due process
and impairment of contracts must win out. Property, i.e., freehold,
cannot be taken without due process nor can contracts be impaired
22
because the nation's economic interests would be improved."
The majority and dissenting opinions in the Michigan
Supreme Court case also illustrate this contrast in policy. The
majority opinion upheld Michigan's dormant mineral statute and
stated that it benefited the public because it improved the
marketability of severed mineral interests, increased the
development of fossil fuels, increased property tax revenue, and
increased employment. 123 The dissenting opinion recognized the
public purpose behind the act, but emphasized the forfeiture of the
mineral interest, which it considered to be a severe impairment of
24
contract rights. 1

Courts have not easily decided whether dormant mineral
statutes are valid, 125 since they have had to consider many issues in
117. Short v. Texaco, Inc., __ Ind.
406 N.E.2d 625, 629, 631-32 (1980), aff'd,
102 S.Ct. 781 (1982).
118. The Short opinion begins by giving four policy justifications for the act: (1) A dormant
mineral interest is "mischievous and contrary to the economic interests and welfare of the public,"
(2) the dormant interests create uncertainties in title, (3) the dormant interests constitute an
impediment to mineral development,
surface development. __ Ind. at-,

and (4) the dormant interests constitute an impediment to

406 N.E.2d at 627.
119. Id.at - , 406 N.E.2d at 630.
120. Id. at __, 406 N.E.2d 630-32. See generally Note, Constitutionality of Retroactive Land
Statutes-Indiana'sModel Dormant MineralAct, 12 IND. L. REV. 455, 482 (1979).
121. Wilson v.Bishop, 82 111.
2d 364, 370, 412 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1980).
122. Wilson v. Bishop, No. 76-CH-7 (Cir.Ct., White County, Ill. Jan. 19, 1979) (quoted in
Outerbridge, supra note 5,at 20-43).
123. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 44, 56, 299 N.W.2d 704, 710, 716 (1980), appeal
dismissed, 102 S.Ct. 1242 (1982).
124. 410 Mich. at 60-62, 299 N.W.2d at 718-19 (Levin,J., dissenting) (4-3 decision).
125. The recent United States Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of
Indiana's dormant minerals act was a 5-4 decision. Short v. Texaco, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982). The
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their determinations. The following subsections of this Note will
examine the traditional legal challenges and the constitutional
challenges raised against dormant mineral acts.
A.

CONFLICTS WITH TRADITIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Traditional dormant mineral statutes consider severed
126
mineral estates "abandoned" after a certain period of nonuse.
These statutes stretch the definition of abandonment by basing it
on the mineral owner's failure to do something. According to the
traditional definition, neglect of one's property is not sufficient to
prove abandonment 2 7 because abandonment generally requires an
act and intent on the part of the owner to relinquish his property. 128
When considering the constitutionality of Nebraska's dormant
mineral act, the Nebraska Supreme Court quoted a commentator's
thoughts about abandonment in the context of dormant mineral
statutes as follows:
"The concept (of abandonment in the statutes of Illinois,
Michigan, and Nebraska) is necessarily predicated upon
an assumption by the legislature that the nature of the
title is such that it is capable of being abandoned.
Whether or not this assumption is a valid one must be
determined by the judicial process. Such determination,
in turn, will require an appraisal or reappraisal of the
basic theory of ownership adopted in the state and an
appraisal or reappraisal of the basic legal principles
129
regarding abandonment of title to real property."
Courts in Michigan and Nebraska made this reappraisal of the
principles of abandonment when considering the constitutionality
of dormant mineral statutes. In the case of Van Slooten v. Larsen1"
Michigan Supreme Court divided 4-3 when upholding the constitutionality of Michigan's dormant
minerals act. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S.
Ct. 1242 (1982). It is interesting to note that no dissenting opinions were filed in the three state
supreme court opinions that invalidated dormant minerals legislation. See Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill.
2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980); Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978); Chicago
& N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977).
126. See, e.g., Mic,4. COMP. LAws ANN. § 554.291 (1967).
127. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
129. Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 839, 272 N.W.2d 768, 771 (1978) (quoting Kuntz, Old
and New Solutions to the Problem of the Outstanding Undeveloped Mineral Interest, 22 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N 81, 97 (1971)).
130. 410 Mich. 21,299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appealdismissed, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
The Michigan dormant minerals statute had been considered four times by appellate courts
before the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court. In the first case, the question of the statute's
constitutionality was not reached. Mask v. Shell Oil Co., 77 Mich. App. 25, 257 N.W.2d 256
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the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the Michigan act,
overcoming the theory that severed minerals cannot be abandoned.
In contrast, the Nebraska Supreme Court in Wheelock v. Heath 3 '
held Nebraska's statute unconstitutional, following the traditional
rule disallowing abandonment.
The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the principles of
abandonment and noted that Nebraska's dormant mineral statute
is contrary to the common law rule, which states that legal title to
land can not be abandoned."' In Nebraska a severed mineral
1 33
interest is a vested property right, an estate in fee simple in land.
It is classified as corporeal 34 and, therefore, generally not subject
to abandonment.1 3 The faulty use of abandonment principles in
the dormant mineral statute was one of the reasons the Nebraska
court used to reach its conclusion that the Nebraska dormant
36
mineral act should not be upheld.1
The Michigan Supreme Court faced a similar situation, since
severed mineral interests in Michigan are also classified as
(1977). The initial case that considered the statute's constitutionality held the statute
unconstitutional in its retroactive application. Bickel v. Fairchild, 83 Mich. App. 467,
-,
268
N.W.2d 881, 884 (1978), rev'd sub nom, Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704
(1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982). The Bickel case involved a contest between surface
owners and owners of mineral interests who had not fulfilled the statutory requirements of the
dormant mineral act so as to preserve their claim. 83 Mich. App. at -, 268 N.W.2d at 882.
In the subsequent case of Van Slooten v. Larsen a result contrary to Bickel was reached. Van
Slooten v. Larsen, 86 Mich. App. 437,
-, 272 N.W.2d 675, 680 (1978), aff'd, 410 Mich. 21, 299
N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982). In Van Slooten the constitutionality of
Michigan's dormant mineral act was considered on stipulated facts. 86 Mich. App, at __,
272
N.W.2d at 676. The case arose following a dispute over the ownership of a severed mineral interest.
The dispute was between a surface owner and a mineral owner who had not fulfilled the
requirements of the statute. Id. The Van Slooten decision did not mention the earlier Bickel decision,
which had declared the act unconstitutional. In 1979 the fourth appellate court decision interpreting
the dormant mineral act was handed down. Wagner v. Dooley, 90 Mich. App. 759, 282 N.W.2d 469
(1979). Wagner v. Dooley was decided on the premise that the act was constitutional. Id. at __,
282
N.W.2d at 471. Because the mineral interest owners did not perform any of the necessary actions
required under the act, the court deemed their interest abandoned and vested it in the surface owners
of the property. Id. at-..,
282 N.W.2d at 472.
In 1979 the conflicting Van Slooten and Bickel decisions were consolidated and argued before the
Michigan Supreme Court. In a 4-3 decision the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed Van Slooten and
reversed Bickel by upholding the constitutionality of the Michigan dormant mineral act as applied in
these cases. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 56, 299 N.W.2d 704, 716 (1980), appeal dismissed,
102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982). On January 18, 1982, the United States Supreme Court dismissed appeals
from the Michigan Supreme Court's decision. Larsen v. Van Slooten, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982); Craig
v. Bickel, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
131. 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978). The Nebraska dormant mineral statute was held
unconstitutional in Wheelock and its companion case, Monahan Cattle Co. v. Goodwin, insofar as the
statute is interpreted to be retroactive in its operation. Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 845, 272
N.W.2d 768, 774 (1978); Monahan Cattle Co. v. Goodwin, 201 Neb. 845, 846, 272 N.W.2d 774,
774(1978).
In Wheelock the facts were not in dispute. The plaintiffs were surface owners and the defendants
were corresponding mineral owners who had acquired their interest more than 23 years prior to the
commencement of the action. 201 Neb. at 838, 272 N.W.2d at 771. The mineral owners had not
fulfilled the requirements of the Nebraska dormant minerals statute. Id. For a comprehensive
analysis of the Wheelock case, see 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 687 (1979).
132. Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 839-40, 272 N.W.2d 768, 771 (1978).
133. Id. at 840, 272 N.W.2d at 771.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 842, 272 N.W.2d at 772.
136. Id. at 839-42, 272 N.W.2d at 771-72.
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corporeal hereditaments, which cannot be abandoned under
common law. 3 7 The Michigan dormant mineral act converts a
corporeal nonabandonable interest into an interest subject to
abandonment. 138 The Michigan court considered whether the act
was a valid exercise of the state's police power. 139 In upholding the
statute, the court found both a valid public purpose 140 and a
reasonable relationship between the act and the purpose. 141 The
Michigan court noted that "[t]he same result could have been
achieved without any reference to the concept of abandonment ....''142
The Indiana Dormant Mineral Interest Act uses the term
"extinguished" instead of "abandoned.' ' 4 3 In Texaco Inc. v.
Short 44 the majority did not discuss the abandonment issue when
considering the constitutionality of Indiana's act, but the dissent
mentioned it in a footnote.1 45 Justice Brennan noted that failure to
comply with the dormant mineral act does not imply that there has
been an abandonment. 4 6 The requirements of a dormant mineral
act may be met, resulting in the loss of a severed mineral estate,
without the traditional elements of intent to abandon and acts
4 7
evidencing that intent. 1

As noted above, the Texaco Court did not have to discuss the
abandonment issue because the Indiana statute is unique in not
using the word "abandoned.'

14 8

considered

act's

the

Nebraska

The Nebraska Supreme Court

faulty

use

of

traditional

14 9
abandonment principles when invalidating it.
Because of the

possible complications in the use of "abandonment," legislatures
would be prudent to draft dormant mineral statutes using other
terms to avoid confusion with traditional legal principles of
abandonment. Then these principles concerning abandonment and
a corporeal classification of severed minerals would not be
"stumbling
blocks"
in declaring a statute legally and
constitutionally valid.
137. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 37, 299 N.W.2d 704, 707 (1980), appeal dismissed,
102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
138. See Micti. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 554.291 (1967).
139. 410 Mich. at 42, 299 N.W.2d at 709.
140. Id. at 43-44, 299 N.W.2d at 710. The act benefits the public by improving the marketability of severed mineral interests, which increases mineral development, property tax income, and
employment. Id.
141. Id. at 44-50, 299 N.W.2d at 710-13.
142. Id. at51 n.24, 299 N.W.2d at 714 n.24.
143. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 (Burns 1980).
144. 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
145. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 799 n.3 (1982) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
148. See id.; IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 (Burns 1980).
149. Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 838-42, 272 N.W.2d 768, 771-72 (1978).
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Proponents of dormant mineral acts often analogize them to
other devices whose constitutionality has already been upheld. One
example of this occurred in the Minnesota case of Contos v.
Herbst. 150 The defendants argued that the dormant mineral statute
was analogous to Minnesota's marketable title act, which had
previously been declared constitutional. 15 1 The court did not find
this argument persuasive because the marketable title act
extinguishes stale claims, while Minnesota's dormant mineral act
extinguishes both valid and invalid claims upon the failure to file a
claim pursuant to the statute. 152 The court also emphasized the
differing consequences in failing to file under the recording act and
53
the dormant mineral statute. 1

When considering the constitutionality of Indiana's dormant
mineral act, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
Indiana statute "is similar in operation to a typical recording
statute.'' 15 The dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's
analogy to a recording statute, stating:
In an attempt to support its refusal seriously to
inquire into the adequacy of the protections afforded
mineral interest owners by which they might preserve
their property, the Court analogizes the Indiana statute to
a recording act and draws on the pre-Fourteenth
Amendment case ofJackson v. Lamphire. .
55
reliance is misplaced. 1

.

.The Court's

In addition to a comparison to a marketable record title act,
several courts have compared dormant mineral acts to statutes of
limitation. In Contos v. Herbst156 the defendants argued that
150. 278 N.W.2d 732 (Minn.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Prest v. Herbst, 444 U.S. 804 (1979). A
plaintiff in the Contos case, United States Steel, owned 721,640 acres of severed mineral interests in
Minnesota. Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Minn.), appeal dismissed sub noma.Prest v.
Herbst, 444 U.S. 804 (1979). The plaintiff brought an action seeking to have the registration,
forfeiture, and tax provisions of the dormant minerals act held unconstitutional. 278 N.W.2d at 735.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision that the statutes were
constitutional except for the forfeiture procedure. Id. at 736, 747. The statute has since been
amended to correct this problem. See MINN. STAT. S 93.52-.58 (1980).
151. 278 N.W.2d at 744. The constitutionality of Minnesota's marketable title act was upheld in
Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957). See supra notes 63-65 and
accompanying text for a discussion of marketable record title acts and their application to severed
mineral interests.
152. 278 N.W.2d at 744-45. Compare MINN. STAT. S 541.023 (1980) (entitled "Actions Affecting
Title to Real Estate") with MINN. STAT. §§ 93.52-58 (1980) (dormant severed minerals legislation).
153. 278 N.W.2d at 746. The court in Contos stated that "[the failure to file under a recording
act does not automatically result in divestiture." Id. In comparison, failure to comply with a
dormant minerals act does automatically result in divesture. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1
(Burns 1980).
154. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 791 (1982).
155. Id. at 799 n.2 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
156. 278 N.W.2d 732 (Minn), appeal dismissedsub nom. Prest v. Herbst, 444 U.S. 804 (1979).
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Minnesota's dormant mineral statute could be profitably compared
to a statute of limitations as failure to file under either statute
divests one of a property interest. 157 The Minnesota court did not
accept this analogy, noting that statutes of limitations generally
affect remedies and not rights.' 58 The Indiana Supreme Court,
however, did analogize Indiana's dormant mineral act to statutes
of limitation in the case of Short v. Texaco, Inc. 159 The court noted
the distinctions between the two types of statutes, but did not find
this controlling. 160 The court emphasized that statutes of limitation
6
must meet a test of reasonableness to be constitutionally upheld.1 '
The court found that the test was met in the Short case because of a
62
two year grace period provided in the act.'
In the later case of Wilson v. Bishop 163 the Illinois Supreme
Court voiced disapproval of the Short decision, specifically the
analogy of the dormant mineral statutes to ordinary statutes of
limitation.1 64 The court stated that "statutes of limitations are
procedural in nature

. . .

and are not designed to alter substantive

rights or convey property interests. The time limitations of the
[dormant mineral statute], however, operate to transfer vested
freehold interests. 165 In affirming the Short decision the United
States Supreme Court did not find the distinction the Wilson court
had noted. The Supreme Court determined that a comparison
between a dormant mineral act and a statute of limitation could be
made because "the practical consequences of extinguishing a right
[through the dormant mineral legislation] are identical to the
consequences of eliminating a remedy [through a statute of
limitation]. ''166
157. 278 N.W.2d at 745.
158. Id.
159. Ind.
406 N.E.2d 625, 629 (1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982). See generally
Note, Constitutionality of Retroactive Land Statutes-Indiana'sModel DormantMineral Act, 12 IND. L. REv.
455 (1979).
160. Short v. Texaco, Inc., __
Ind. at __,
161. Id. at __,
406 N.E.2d at 630.

406 N.E.2d at 629.

162. Id. The grace period in Indiana's dormant mineral act gave mineral owners two years after
the act's effective date in which to file their claim. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-4 (Burns 1980).
Therefore, after 1973 a mineral interest owner must meet the statutory requirements or the reversion
will occur.
163. 82 Ill. 2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980). In Wilson a surface owner claimed ownership of an
undivided one-third interest in the oil and gas discovered under his 72 acre tract of land because the
defendant mineral owners' failed to file written notices of claim pursuant to Illinois' dormant
mineral act. Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d at 366, 412 N.E.2d at 523.
164. Id. at 371-72, 412 N.E.2d at 525-26. The same analogy was approved by the Michigan
Supreme Court. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 40-41, 299 N.W.2d 704, 708-09 (1980),
appealdismissed, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
165. 82 Il1. 2d at 373, 412 N.E.2d at 526.
166. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 791 (1982).
The Nebraska dormant mineral statute was analogized to a possibility of reverter. Wheelock v.
Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 843, 272 N.W.2d 768, 773 (1978). The Nebraska court, however, found a vast
difference between the slight value of a possibility of reverter and the conceivably great value of
severed mineral interests. Id.
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Although analogies have been made between dormant mineral
acts and marketable title acts or statutes of limitation, these
analogies have not always been effective in convincing courts that
dormant mineral statutes should be upheld. Courts, however, have
not had to rely on the breakdown in these analogies or the problems
inherent in the use of abandonment principles to invalidate
dormant mineral legislation. All the statutes also faced several
serious state and federal constitutional challenges.
B.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

1. In General
The one constitutional challenge that all the dormant mineral
167
statutes have encountered is violation of procedural due process.
This important constitutional challenge will be discussed in part
two of this section. 168 In addition to procedural due process
problems, dormant mineral statutes have also been attacked as
impairing the obligation of contracts, 16 9 violating equal protection
17
guarantees, 17 0 violating substantive due process guarantees, '
72
taking without just compensation, 1 containing unconstitutional
presumptions, 1 73 and being unconstitutionally vague. 174 Each of
these constitutional issues will be considered briefly to determine
how different courts analyzed them.
Impairment of contracts was one of the most prevalent
constitutional challenges to dormant mineral statutes. 175 The
Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . law

impairing the obligation of contracts." 76 A Michigan appellate
court specifically based its decision that the Michigan dormant
mineral statute was unconstitutional upon the impairment of the
contract rights of the mineral owners. 77 Another Michigan
appellate court considered the same issues, impairment of contracts
167. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d 364, 370, 412 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1980) (procedural due
process violation alone sufficient to invalidate statute).
168. See infra notes 224-64 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 175-85 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 202-12 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
175. See generally Note, Constitutionalityof Retroactive Land Statutes-Indiana'sModel Dormant Mineral
Act, 12 IND. L. REV. 455, 486-92 (1972) (contract clause should not influence analysis of dormant
mineral statute; issue should be whether procedurai due process has been satisfied).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 10.
177. Bickel v. Fairchild, 83 Mich. App. 467,
-, 268 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1978), rev'd sub nom.
Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Craig v.
Bickel, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
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and constitutionality of the statute, and reached the opposite
result. 178
The Michigan Supreme Court determined that a recording
requirement was not a substantial impairment of the contract relationship in Van Slooten v. Larsen'79 and concluded that the
defendants were not induced into entering contractual relationships
by the lack of a recording requirement. 180 The three justice dissent
to the Van Slooten decision found fault in the majority's analysis of
the contract clause issue and stressed the severe impairment of
contracts, both the obligation to record and the consequences upon
failure to do so. 181
The United States Supreme Court quickly rejected the
argument that Indiana's Mineral Lapse Act constituted an
impermissible impairment of contracts.18 2 The Court mentioned
that the mineral owners in Texaco, Inc. v. Short' 83 leased after the
statutory lapse of their rights and that a statute cannot impair a
contract which was not in existence at the time of the statute's
enactment. 1 84 The Court went beyond the facts in issue and stated:
"In any event, a mineral owner may safeguard any contractual
obligations or rights by filing a statement of claim in the county
recorder's office. Such a minimal 'burden' on contractual
85
obligations is not beyond the scope of permissible state action." 1
Another constitutional challenge that was brought before
several state courts in an attempt to invalidate dormant mineral
acts is an alleged equal protection violation. 86 In Michigan courts
18 7
the argument was made that the Michigan dormant mineral act'
denied equal protection because it applied only to oil and gas and
178. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 86 Mich. App. 437, -, 272 N.W.2d 675, 681 (1978), aff'd, 410
Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982). See generally Polito, Real
Property, Natural Resourceand Environmental Law, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 769, 793 (1980).
179. 410 Mich. 21, 41, 56, 299 N.W.2d 704, 709, 716 (1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 1242
(1982).
180. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 40, 299 N.W.2d 704, 708 (1980), appeal dismissed,
102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982). In Van Slooten the Michigan Supreme Court noted its approval of the Indiana
Supreme Court's treatment of the contract clause issue. 410 Mich. at 40-41, 299 N.W.2d at 708-09.
The Indiana court upheld its dormant mineral statute as being within the state's police power and,
therefore, not an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contracts. Short v. Texaco, Inc.,
Ind.
-,...
406 N.E.2d 625, 631 (1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
181. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. at 60, 299 N.W.2d at 718 (Levin,J., dissenting).
182. Texaco, Inc. v, Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 792-93 (1982).
183. 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
184. Id. at 792.
185. Id. at 792-93 (footnote omitted).
186. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides
that "[nlo state shall ... deny to any person ... the equal protection of the laws." Id.
A Wisconsin trial court held the Wisconsin dormant mineral act unconstitutional because it
violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. Chicago & N.W. Transp.
Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 570-71, 259 N.W.2d 316, 318 (1977). The Wisconsin Supreme
Court did not reach the equal protection issue as it found the entire statute invalid based on due
process violations. Id. at 571 n.2, 259 N.W.2d at 318 n.2.
187. Minc. COMP. LAws ANN. S 554.291(l) (1967).
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not to other minerals. 18 8 A Michigan appellate court determined
that "[sjince the Act does not involve any suspect classification, the
proper standard of evaluation is the 'rational basis' test."' 18 9 The
court concluded that there was a rational basis between the
legislative policy of encouraging oil and gas development and the
application of the dormant mineral act to oil and gas only and,
therefore, upheld the constitutionality of the act against the equal
protection challenge. 90 In affirming the lower court's decision the
Supreme Court of Michigan also rejected the equal protection
challenge.' 9 1 The court agreed that treating oil and gas differently
from "hard" minerals had a reasonable relation to the dormant
mineral act's purpose.

192

Because of a unique provision in the Indiana dormant mineral
statute, the Indiana Supreme Court faced a different equal
protection challenge. The Indiana statute treats owners of ten or
1 93
more mineral interests in the same county different from others.
The Indiana court used "the traditional fair and substantial
relation test" in its consideration of whether there was an equal
protection violation.194 To analyze whether the criteria set forth in
the statute advanced the purpose the legislature was trying to
achieve in enacting the dormant mineral legislation, the court
needed to define the statute's purpose. 95 The court determined
that "the Legislature sought to create an environment in which
96
mineral interests [would] be promptly exploited or abandoned."
As it is usual and profitable for developers to join several mineral
interests, the legislature gave some leeway to the owners of ten or
more interests in the same county to encourage these mineral
developers. 97 The Indiana court concluded that the special
188. See Van Slooten v. Larsen, 86 Mich. App. 437, __,
272 N.W.2d 675, 681 (1978), aff'd,
410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982); Van Slooten v.
Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 55-56,299 N.W.2d 704, 716 (1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct 1242 (1982).
189. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 86 Mich. App. at -. , 272 N.W.2d at 681.
190. Id. The appellate court also noted that the act "treats all those similarly situated equally;
all owners of severed oil and gas rights run the risk of abandoning their rights if they do not comply
with the statutory requirements," Id.
191. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. at 55, 299 N.W.2d at 716.
192. Id. at 55-56, 299 N.W.2d at716.
193. IND. ANN. STAT. S 32-5-11-5 (Burns 1980). Section 32-5-11-5 of the Indiana Code provides
that failure to file a claim of interest within the specified time period will not automatically cause the
extinguishment of a mineral interest if four qualifications are met: (1) The mineral owner owned 10
or more mineral interests in the county; (2) the owner made diligent efforts to preserve his mineral
interests, including filing statements of claim on some interests; (3) the owner failed to preserve the
interest inadvertently; and (4) the owner filed a claim within 60 days after there was published or
actual notice that the interest had lapsed. Id.
194. Short v. Texaco, Inc., Ind.
406 N.E.2d 625, 632 (1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct.
781 (1982). The basis for using "the substantial relation test" was the determination that the
dormant mineral act's different treatment of some mineral owners did not involve a suspect
classification or the impingement upon a fundamental right. - Ind. at __, 406 N.E.2d at 632.
195.

-.

Ind. at

-__, 406 N.E.2d at 631.

196. Id.
197. Id. at __,

406 N.E.2d at 632.
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treatment provided by the Indiana dormant mineral act to large
developers was rationally related to the legislative objective of
increased development and not contrary to equal protection
98
guarantees. 1
The United States Supreme Court also considered the
possibility of an equal protection violation. 199 It agreed with the
Indiana Supreme Court's determination that there was a legitimate
purpose to the special treatment of large developers and that this
purpose was related to the central purpose of the statute. 20 0 The
Court concluded by stating: "Since the exception furthers a
legitimate statutory purpose, and has no adverse impact on persons
• ..who own fewer mineral interests, the exception does not violate
20
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." , 1
The constitutional issue of a substantive due process
violation 20 2 was considered when the Wisconsin dormant mineral
statute's constitutionality was at issue in Chicago & North Western
Transportation Co. v. Pedersen.20 3 The plaintiffs alleged that the
statute's forfeiture provision denied them substantive due process
and was an unreasonable use of the state's police power. 204 The test
used to determine whether there is a proper use of the police power
in Wisconsin consists of two parts: (1) Whether there is a proper
purpose, and (2) whether the means chosen have a reasonable
relation to that purpose 205 The court determined that this test was
not met because the statute provides for forfeiture of a property
interest and because this property interest forfeits to another
person. 20 6 Because the means used to solve dormant mineral
problems did not satisfy the Wisconsin court's test, the court
concluded that the statute denied substantive due process and was
207
unconstitutional.
198. Id. at __, 406 N.E.2d at 631-32.
199. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 797 (1982).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides that
"[n]o state shall . ..deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ......

Id.
203. 80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977). In Chicago an action was brought against the
Wisconsin registers of deeds by the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad, owners of more than
250,000 acres of severed mineral interests in Wisconsin, to have the statute declared unconstitutional
and to have its enforcement enjoined. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566,
570, 259 N.W.2d 316, 318 (1977). The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision
holding the entire statute unconstitutional. Id. at 568-71, 259 N.W.2d at 317-18.
204. Id. at 574, 259 N.W.2d at 320.
205. Id.
206. Id. The attorney general argued that the reversion to the surface owner was a quasi-public
use connected with the public necessity of clearing questionable mineral ownership. Id The Chicago
court considered this argument unpersuasive because the mineral owners were not being
compensated and the importance of clearing mineral titles was not such that the reversion of the
minerals to the surface became a quasi-public use. Id. at 575, 259 N.W.2d at 320.
207. Id. at 570, 574, 259 N.W.2d at 318, 320.
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Although other courts have not specifically discussed
substantive due process, they have analyzed a state's police power
to enact dormant mineral legislation. For example, the Michigan
Supreme Court stated that the purpose of Michigan's act was "to
facilitate the development of oil and gas resources," a valid public
purpose.20 8 It determined that a reasonable relationship existed
between this purpose and the means used to achieve it.209 The first
issue the United States Supreme Court considered in the Texaco
case was whether the State of Indiana had the power to provide that
property rights could be lost if the owners did not take the action
required by statute. 210 The Court noted that the dormant mineral

act changed a vested property interest entitled to the same
protection as a fee simple to an interest "of less than absolute
duration." 2 1 1 The Supreme Court concluded that Indiana's police

power was sufficient to enact dormant mineral legislation and
stated, "[w]e have no doubt that, just as a State may create a
property interest that is entitled to constitutional protection, the
State has the power to condition the permanent retention of that
property right on the performance of reasonable conditions that
indicate a present intention to retain the interest. "212
Three other constitutional challenges have been raised against
dormant mineral acts. In Indiana the appellee argued that the
statute involved a taking of property without just compensation in
violation of the Indiana Constitution. 213 The court determined,
however, that the state was not exercising its power of eminent
domain, as it was "not actually taking the mineral interest for its
own use and benefit. "214 Instead, the statute declares that a
21 5
mineral interest lapses upon occurrence of specified conditions.
The United States Supreme Court agreed that no impermissible
taking is involved in the Indiana dormant mineral statute because it
208. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 43, 299 N.W.2d 704, 710 (1980), appeal dismissed,
102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982). The court stated: "The act as a whole works to the benefit of the public by
improving the marketability of severed mineral interests and thereby increasing the development of
fossil fuels, the revenues from property taxes, and employment with its related benefits." 410 Mich.
at 44, 299 N.W.2d at 710.
209. 410 Mich. at 49, 299 N.W.2d at 712-13.
210. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 789 (1982).
211. Id. at 790.
212. Id. The dissent in Texaco also agreed that Indiana had a legitimate interest in establishing a
registration system to identify severed mineral owners and that extinguishment of the mineral right
may be an appropriate sanction for failure to register. Id. at 797-98 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
213. Short v. Texaco, Inc., Ind.
406 N.E.2d 625, 631 (1980), aff'd 102 S. Ct.
781 (1982).
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "private property [shall
not] be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V. This provision has
been incorporated by the fourteenth amendment and thus is applicable to the states. See Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
214. - Ind.at __,
406 N.E.2d at 631.
215. Id.
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is the owner's failure that causes loss of the property, not action by
the state.

21

6

Two Michigan courts faced arguments that Michigan's
dormant mineral statute created an unconstitutional presumption
of abandonment. The Michigan appellate court determined that
the statute did create a conclusive presumption of abandonment,
but that the presumption could be upheld because it was not
"arbitrary

or capricious.

' 21 7

Although

the

appellate

court's

determination that the Michigan dormant mineral act was
constitutional was upheld by the Michigan Supreme Court, the
lower court's conclusion as to presumptions was not. 21 8 The
Michigan Supreme Court decided that the statute did not create an
evidentiary presumption, but rather a rule of substantive law,
which required mineral owners every twenty years to take steps
21 9
showing their ownership.
The Minnesota Supreme Court encountered the argument
that some of the language used in Minnesota's dormant mineral
statute was unconstitutionally vague. 220 The court followed the rule
that "[a] statute will not be declared void for vagueness unless it is
so uncertain and indefinite that after exhausting all rules of
construction it is impossible to ascertain legislative intent. "221 The
legislative intent is expressly stated in the Minnesota dormant
mineral statute as one of identification and clarification of
fractionalized severed mineral interests. 222 The court determined
that the alleged ambiguities could be reasonably construed
consistent with this legislative intent, and therefore, the statute was
223
not unconstitutionally vague.

Each of these possible constitutional challenges should be
considered by states that are planning to enact dormant mineral
legislation. Although these constitutional principles can be used in
216. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 792(1982).
217. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 86 Mich. App. 437,
-, 272 N.W.2d 675, 680 (1978), aff'd, 410
Mich. 21,299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appealdismissed, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
218. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 49-50, 299 N.W.2d 704, 713 (1980), appealdismissed,
102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
219. 410 Mich. at 51, 299 N.W.2d at 713. The court added that even if the statute created a
presumption of abandonment, it would not be an unconstitutional one because a rational connection
existed between the fact established (no public ownership) and the fact to be presumed
(abandonment). Id. at 51-52, 299 N.W.2d at 714.
220. Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 746 (Minn.), appeal dismissed sub noam. Prest v. Herbst,
444 U.S. 804 (1979). The specific language that was challenged includes "minerals," 'interest in
the minerals," and "created or acquired." Id. See MINN. STAT. § 93.52(2)(1980).
221. 278 N.W.2d at 746 (citation omitted). The Minnesota court relied on the case of Wichelman
v. Messner in their analysis of vagueness. Id. (citing Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83
N.W.2d 800 (1957)). According to the court in Wichelman, words commonly understood are not void
for vagueness unless the entire statute is so imperfect that it can not be reasonably construed. 250
Minn. 88,-., 83 N.W.2d 800, 819(1957).
222. Seesupra note 76 for the text of the purpose of the Minnesota dormant mineral statute.

223. 278 N.W.2d at 746-47.
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an attempt to defeat a dormant mineral act, the most effective
weapon seems to be that of alleged procedural due process
inadequacies. State supreme courts in Illinois, Minnesota,
Nebraska, and Wisconsin all found disabling due process violations
in dormant mineral statutes.
2. ProceduralDue Process Violations
When the state deprives a person of his property there must be
compliance

with the due process clause. 2

24

Two of the basic

elements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 2 5 When courts examined dormant mineral statutes to

determine whether they complied with due process requirements,
they reached different conclusions. These results can be
226
rationalized on the basis that the statutes are not identical.
Courts, however, have come to opposite conclusions after analysis
of the same United States Supreme Court cases and similar
dormant mineral statutes. 227 Therefore, it again appears that a

court's philosophy towards mineral exploitation affects its ultimate
determination regarding the constitutionality of the state's dormant
228
mineral act.

Each of the six state courts and the United States Supreme
Court considered the issue of whether procedural due process
requirements had been met before the loss of severed mineral
interests pursuant to a dormant mineral act. The case relied on by
most courts in their due process analysis was Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.

229

In Mullane Justice Jackson stated that

"at a minimum [the words of the due process clause] require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded
by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
224. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. ("No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law...").
225. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). See generally j.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &.1.
YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 499 (1978).
226. See Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. at 36 n. 1, 299 N.W.2d at 707 n. .
227. For example, the dormant mineral acts adopted by Illinois and Michigan are very similar.
Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
197-198 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981) with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
SS 554.291-.294 (1967). The state courts that considered these statutes, however, reached opposite
conclusions on the issues of procedural due process violations and the statute's constitutionality.
Compare Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill.
2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980) with Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410
Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
228. Seesupra notes 116-124 and accompanying text.
229. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Mullane the Court considered a New York statute that permitted
notice by publication of judicial settlement of the accounts of a trust estate. Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 309-10 (1950). The majority opinion explained the
requirements necessary to comply with procedural due process guarantees. Id. at 313-14. Notice by
publication pursuant to the New York statute was deemed constitutional when applied to
beneficiaries whose addresses or interests were unknown. Id. at 317. The court determined, however,
that at least notice by mail would be necessary for the known beneficiaries. Id. at 318.
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the case. "230 The Minnesota Supreme Court considered Mullane
and concluded that the Minnesota dormant mineral act's failure to
provide a hearing before forfeiture was a clear violation of due
process. 2 31

In

contrast,

the

United

States

Supreme

Court

determined that Mullane was inapplicable to Indiana's dormant
mineral act because the Indiana act is self-executing and there is no
judicial proceeding involved.2 3 2 Before analyzing the Supreme
Court's due process discussion, this Note will consider the analysis
used by state courts to find due process violations and thus hold the
dormant mineral acts unconstitutional.
When determining whether the due process standard was met,
these courts followed the same general analysis. The initial question
was whether there was a property interest that fell under the
protection of the due process clause. These courts generally agreed
that the mineral interests covered by the dormant mineral
legislation were property deserving of this protection. 233 Next, the
courts asked whether there was a deprivation of this protected
property without notice and an opportunity for a hearing. When
they found

this deprivation, 23 4 the courts concluded that the

235
dormant mineral acts were in violation of the due process clause.
The supreme courts in Illinois, 23 6 Minnesota,2 3 7 Nebraska, 238 and
Wisconsin 239 found that the dormant mineral legislation of those
230. Id. at 313.
231. Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 743 (Minn.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Prest v. Herbst,
444 U.S. 804 (1979).
232. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 795 (1982).
Note that Nebraska's dormant mineral act is not self-executing. It requires that the surface
owner sue in equity for the termination of an abandoned severed mineral interest. See NEB. REV.
STAT. § 57-228 (1978). Nevertheless, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the retroactive
application of this statute violated the due process clause. Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 845,
272 N.W.2d 768, 774 (1978).
233. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that "[ilt is accordingly clear that the severed mineral
interests here under consideration constitute protected property interests entitled to the procedural
safeguards which due process requires." Wilson v. Bishop, 82 I1. 2d at 369, 412 N.E.2d at 524. The
Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that "mineral interests are vested property rights. ITheyl are
subject to the protection of the due process clause." Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. at 840, 272
N.W.2d at 771.
234. Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d at 743 ("We cannot imagine a more clear violation of due
process than the failure to provide a hearing before forfeiture."); Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. at
845, 272 N.W.2d at 773 ("No notice of any nature was given to the record owner of a minerai
interest. ").
235. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Il1. 2d at 370, 412 N.E.2d at 525 ("Failure to provide those
owners with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard renders the statutory scheme
unconstitutional.").
236. See id.
237. See Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d at 740. The Minnesota statute attempted to provide
some notice of the mineral forfeiture through publication in legal and mining publications. The
Minnesota Supreme Court did not find that notice constitutionally adequate. 278 N.W.2d at 742-43.
The court also considered the argument that the hearing was only postponed and the notice was
adequate according to the decision ofFuentes v. Shevin. 278 N.W.2d at 744 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972)). The Minnesota court found the Fuentes exception inapplicable for two reasons.
There was no later opportunity to contest the loss of one's property such as was available in Fuentes,
and there was no reason for a prompt forfeiture such as existed in Fuentes. 278 N.W.2d at 744.
238. See Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978).
239. See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977).
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states did not meet due process requirements and, as a result, were
unconstitutional.
241
The state supreme

24 0
courts in Indiana

and Michigan

upheld the constitutionality of the Indiana and Michigan dormant
mineral acts even though the statutes provide for no more notice or
hearing than the statutes that were declared unconstitutional in
other states. The Indiana court recognized that severed mineral
interests are vested property interests protected by due process of
law. 242 The court distinguished Mullane24

3

on the basis that Mullane

referred to the due process required in an adjudicatory
proceeding. 24 4 The Indiana dormant mineral act is self-executing
and does not require an adjudication before the mineral interest is
extinguished. 24 5 The court concluded that Mullane does not require
notice and a hearing prior to an extinguishment pursuant to the
246
Indiana dormant mineral statute.

The Michigan Supreme Court took a different approach
towards the procedural due process requirements of notice and
hearing. That court stated that the act itself provided sufficient
notice of the recordation requirement.

24 7

The Michigan court

explained that a hearing is not required because "the constitutional
necessity for such a hearing is determined by balancing the
competing interests at stake. "248 The court determined that the risk
of harm from the deprivation of dormant mineral interests was
slight and emphasized that although a predeprivation hearing is not
provided, there is a later opportunity for a hearing to determine
24
whether the statute was correctly applied.

9

The Michigan and Indiana courts upheld the validity of the
Michigan and Indiana dormant mineral statutes even though the
statutes do not provide actual notice or the opportunity for a
hearing before the severed mineral interest is extinguished through
, 406 N.E.2d 625 (1980), aff'd 102 S. Ct. 781
240. See Short v. Texaco, Inc., __ Ind.
(1982).
241. See Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed, 102 S.
Ct. 1242 (1982).
406 N.E.2d 625, 627 (1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct.
242. Short v. Texaco, Inc., __ Ind.
781 (1982).
243. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
244.

__

Ind. at __,

406 N.E.2d at 628.

245. See IND. ANN. STAT. S 32-5-11-1 (Burns 1980).
246.
-. Ind. at __, 406 N.E.2d at 628. The Indiana Supreme Court noted that if there were
a question as to whether the facts existed to extinguish an interest pursuant to the dormant mineral
406 N.E.2d at 629.
act, the mineral owner would have notice before a hearing in court. Id. at __,
247. 410 Mich. at 52 n.28, 299 N.W.2d at 714 n.28. The Indiana court also stated that the
406 N.E.2d at 629.
enactment itself was sufficient notice. Short v. Texaco, Inc., __ Ind. at __,
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, clearly rejected this thesis, stating that "[t]here is no
Co. v. Pedersen,
&
N.W.
Transp.
itself
is
notice]."
Chicago
authority for that argument [that the act
80 Wis. 2d at 573 n.4, 259 N.W.2d at 319 n.4.
248. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. at 53, 299 N.W.2d at 715 (citations omitted).
249. Id. at 54-55, 299 N.W.2d at 715-16.
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vesting with the surface estate. The Indiana court relied on its
interpretation of the wording in the Mullane opinion, and the
Michigan court used a balancing approach to escape the traditional
due process hearing requirement. The United States Supreme
Court also faced the due process issue when considering the
constitutionality of Indiana's Dormant Mineral Interests Act in
Texaco, Inc. v. Short. 250 The five justice majority noted that lack of
notice was the appellants' primary attack on the act. 25 1 The Court

divided the appellants' notice issue into two arguments and then
252
rejected both of them.

The first argument was that the State of Indiana did not
adequately notify the mineral owners of the statute's legal
requirements. 25 The Court answered this argument with two legal
principles:
It is well established that persons owning property within
a State are charged with knowledge of relevant statutory
provisions affecting the control or disposition of such
property. 254
It is also settled that the question whether a statutory
grace period provides an adequate opportunity for
citizens to become familiar with a new law is a matter on
which the Court shows the greatest deference to the
55
judgment of state legislatures.2
The secon-! argument was that the surface owner must give the
mineral owner advance notice that the interest was about to expire
before the interest could be extinguished. 25 6 In answering this
argument the Court emphasized the difference between a selfexecuting statute and a judicial determination. 25 7 The notice and
hearing requirements of Mullane2 58 were not deemed necessary
250. 102 S. Ct. 781,793 (1982).
251. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. at 793.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. (citing North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925)).
255. 102 S. Ct. at 793 (citing Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1902); Jackson v.
Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280, 289 (1830)).
The majority of the Texaco Court did not expressly state a philosophy in favor of mineral
exploration and development by upholding the constitutionality of Indiana's dormant mineral act.
Instead, the Court appeared to be more concerned with letting the state handle a matter that is
mostly of state interest. For example, the Court stated that it "shows the greatest deference to the
judgment of state legislatures" and that "[a] legislative body is in a far better position than a court to
form a correct judgment." 102 S. Ct. at 793. The Court also said they "refuse[d] to displace hastily
the judgment of the Legislature." Id. at 794.
256. 102 S. Ct. at 794.
257. Id.
258. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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because of this distinction. 25

9

The Court concluded by stating that

"neither [argument] has merit ' 2 60 and that the Indiana act has
'no procedural defect.' '261
The four justice dissent framed the due process issue as
follows:
[W]hether the State of Indiana has deprived these
appellants of due process of law by extinguishing their
pre-existing property interests without regard to whether
they knew, and without providing any meaningful
mechanism by which they might have learned, of the
immediate taking of their property or their obligations
under the law.

26 2

The dissent emphasized the notions of fairness, rationality, and
practicality. 26 3 Justice Brennan concluded that notice should be
required because the registration statute is unusual in character
and because it is triggered by commonplace circumstances under
which an average mineral owner would not realize he had a legal
obligation.264
VI.

CONCLUSION
ARE DORMANT
STATUTES THE ANSWER?

MINERAL

The United States Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of one dormant mineral statute 26 5 and has
dismissed an appeal of a state court decision that upheld the
constitutionality of another.2 66 These decisions do not change the
earlier state court determinations that dormant mineral acts in
Illinois, Nebraska, and Wisconsin are unconstitutional. Nor do
they declare any similar, yet unenacted, statutes constitutional.267
A state court that is considering a newly enacted dormant mineral
act, or a state court that, in light of the Texaco 268 case, has decided to
reconsider a previous decision regarding the constitutionality of a
259. 102 S. Ct. at 795. The court in Texaco stated that "[tihe reasoning in Mullane isapplicable
to ajudicial proceeding brought to determine whether a lapse of a mineral estate did or did not occur,
but not to the self-executing feature of the Mineral Lapse Act." Id.
260. Id.at 793.
261. Id.at 796.
262. Id. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent did not say that the statute is unconstitutional in its prospective application, but only retrospectively. Id. at 798, 805.
263. Id. at 800.
264. Id. at 802-03.
265. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S.Ct. 781 (1982).
266. Larsen v. Van Slooten, 102 S. Ct. 1242 (1982).
267. The Texaco court remarked in a footnote that it was not deciding if a'state could presume
abandonment of a severed mineral interest if "the statutory period of nonuse is shorter than that
involved here [20 years]" or if "the interest affected is such that concepts of 'use' or 'nonuse' have
little meaning." 102 S. Ct. at 795 n.28.
268. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
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dormant mineral statute, can declare the statute void on grounds
other than violation of the federal Constitution. For example, the
terms of most dormant mineral statutes vary. Therefore, courts can
attempt to distinguish their decisions from Texaco based on these
variances. State courts also have the option to decide that the state
constitution has more stringent requirements than the federal
Constitution, and they can invalidate an act on a violation of the
state constitution. 269 In addition, a dormant mineral statute may be
invalidated because of a conflict with legal principles of
abandonment or with the state's classification of severed mineral
270
interests as corporeal.
The North Dakota Legislature has considered enacting a
dormant mineral act to deal with abandoned severed mineral
interests,2 7 1 and it will probably consider this issue again in the
future. The Indiana statute upheld by the United States Supreme
Court is not the best model for every state. 272 Each state legislature
must consider its own philosophy towards mineral development
and towards legislation that affects the private ownership of real
property. Assuming that a severed mineral interest in North
Dakota is a corporeal interest, a dormant mineral statute would
change the general rule that prohibits abandonment of such an
interest.2 7 3 Another problem might arise because of a special

section in the North Dakota Constitution, which provides that the
state may not make "donations" to any individual. 274 Arguably,
this section could prohibit North Dakota from utilizing a
traditional dormant mineral statute that vests the abandoned
mineral interest with the surface estate. Also, state courts could
interpret the North Dakota Constitution's due process clause, 275
which is different from the federal clause, more strictly than the
Texaco court interpreted the tederal due process clause, thereby
requiring notice and a hearing before loss of the minerals. The
269. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d 364, 366, 412 N.E.2d 522, 523, 526 (1980) (Illinois act
violates the due process and contract clauses of the Illinois Constitution); Wheelock v. Heath, 201
Neb. 835, 845, 272 N.W.2d 768, 774 (1978) (Nebraska act violates the due process and contracts
clauses of the Nebraska Constitution).
270. See, e.g., Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. at 835, 839-42, 272 N.W.2d at 771-72.
271. See supra note 7.
272. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 to -8 (Burns 1980). The Indiana act does have some good
points. For example, it does not use the term "abandonment," but instead discusses a reversion. Id.
§ 32-5-11 - 1. One problem area in the Indiana act is the special exception for large developers. Id.
§ 32-5-11-5. This section may be subject to attack as violative of the equal protection clause.
273. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
274. N.D. CONST. art. X, § 18. Note also that § 47-01-10 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides that "[tihe state is the owner . . . of all property of which there is no other owner." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 47-01-10 (1978).
275. N.D. CONST. art I, § 9. North Dakota's civil due process clause provides: "All courts shall
be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have
remedy by due process of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay." Id.
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United States Supreme Court hinted that more notice might be
advisable when it stated that "the question in this case is whether
additional notice is constitutionally required, and not whether such
notice might better serve the purposes of the statute. "276
The State of Minnesota has passed legislation that seems to
balance a mineral owner's property interests with the public policy
of encouraging

mineral development. 2 77

Although the statute

requires the affirmative act of recordation by the severed mineral
owners, it is arguable that this burden is necessary to the public's
interest in development of natural resources. The Minnesota
statute does not present two of the serious problems that other
dormant mineral acts have encountered. The mineral interest
forfeits to the state rather than the surface owner, and notice and a
hearing are provided before the forfeiture. 27 8 The Minnesota
Legislature added the procedural due process requirements of
notice and a hearing 27 9 without defeating the dormant mineral act's
purpose of identifying and clarifying severed mineral interests to
280
encourage mineral development.
If a state can draft a dormant mineral act that is consistent
with common law rules of abandonment and that does not violate
the due process clause, this, along with a constitutional tax, could
281
solve the problems associated with dormant severed minerals.
The interests of the public, landowners, mineral owners, and
developers must be considered and balanced when states, like
North Dakota, attempt to devise effective and equitable solutions to
the problems of dormant severed mineral interests.
CYNTHIAJ. NORLAND
276. 102 S.Ct. at 797 n.34.
277. MINN. STAT. S 93.52-.58 (1981).

278. Id. 5 93.55.
279. MINN. STAT. 5 93.55(2) (1981). Procedural due process is based upon a notion of fairness.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501 (1978). See also
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972). State courts can and should impose procedural due
process requirements upon legislative enactments that deprive a person of a vested property interest
in an unfair manner.
280. See supra note 76 for the statement of purpose behind Minnesota's dormant mineral act.
281. If the North Dakota Legislature feels that the solution of a traditional dormant mineral
statute and taxation of severed mineral interests creates too many constitutional problems, there is
another method that could be used to deal with abandoned severed mineral interests. The legislature
could create its own "abandoned and unclaimed mineral act," similar to the North Dakota
Disposition of Abandoned and Unclaimed Property Act. See N.D. CENT. CODE SS 47-30-01 to -28
(1978 & Supp. 1981) (covers personal property).
Arguably, because the state already has a system in existence for personal property, it also could
manage the abandoned mineral interests. But, objections can also be made to an "abandoned and
unclaimed mineral act." See Note, Severed Mineral Interests, supra note 5, at 459. One obvious problem
this type of legislation would face is that it reverses two common law theories: that real property
cannot be abandoned and that intent and actions by the owner are necessary for abandonment. For a
procedure whereby abandoned mineral interests would be held in trust in perpetuity by the state
after notice and a hearing until claimed by the owner, see N.D. LEG. RES. COMM. REP.31, 41st Sess.
(1969).

SeeJ.

